Saturday, August 13, 2011

writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 5 to take action against the respondents 6 to 15 herein for encroaching upon by way of private security agencies and parking vehicles as if it is a private car


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :-07.09.2010

Coram


The HONOURABLE MR.M.Y.EQBAL THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
The HONOURABLE  MR. JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM

W.P.No.7854 of  2010 &
M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2010


K.Krishnamani .. Petitioner

vs.


1    CORPORATION OF CHENNAI                      
     REP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER
     RIPPON BUILDINGS
     CHENNAI-3.

2    COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     CHENNAI CITY  EGMOREM CHENNAI-8.

3.   DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     TRAFFIC NORTH,  CHENNAI-2.

4.   ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     TRAFFIC ZONE,  KILPAUK,  CHENNAI-10.

5.   INSPECTOR OF POLICE
     B-1  NORTH BEACH TRAFFIC RANGE
     CHENNAI.

6.   INDIAN BANK
     REP. BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER  MAIN BUILDING
     RAJAJI SALAI  CHENNAI-1.

7.   GENERAL MANAGER
     INDIAN BANK
     INDIAN BANK BUILDING
     JAFAR SYRANG STREET
     CHENNAI-1.

8    UNITED TRUST OF INDIA HOUSE
     REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
     2ND LINE  BEACH STREET
     MANNADY  CHENNAI.


9    JESUS CALLS
     REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR
     JESUS CALLS BUILDING
     RAJAJI BUILDING  CHENNAI-1.

10.  AS SHIPPING LIMITED
     REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR
     OPP. TO  CATHOLIC CHURCH
     ARMENIAN STREET  CHENNAI-1.

11.  HOT CHIPS RESTAURANT
     REP. BY ITS MANAGER
     NO.225  NSC BOSE ROAD
     CHENNAI-1.

12.  OLYMPIC CARDS AND STATIONERIES
     REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR
     NSC BOSE ROAD,CHENNAI-1.

13.  APPOLLO HOSPITAL
     REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
     GREAMS ROAD,CHENNAI.

14.  MALAR HOSPITAL
     REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
     GANDHI NAGAR,ADYAR
     CHENNAI.

15   STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
     REP. BY ITS MANAGER
     ARMENIAN STREET,CHENNAI-1.


PRAYER : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 5 to take action against the respondents 6 to 15 herein for encroaching upon by way of private security agencies and parking vehicles as if it is a private car parking area and further direct the respondents 6 to 15 to prohibit encroaching upon by way of private security agencies and parking vehicles as if it is a private car parking area, the road margin.

     For Petitioner :Mr.K.Sudalaikannu

         For Respondents:Mr.L.N.Praghasam  R1

Mr.Rajakalifullah, Govt.Pleader
Assisted by Mrs.M.Sneha,G.A.-R2toR5

Mr.M.Balachandar -R6 & R7

Mr.A.M.Packianathan Easter -R9

Mr.R.Sankara Narayanan  R10

Mr.V.R.Thangavelu  R11

    Mrs.Hema Sampath, Sr.counsel
for Mr.S.Venkateswar  R12

Mr.Sathish Parasaran - R14
*****

O R D E R


THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE &
T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.


By way of this Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner seeks a direction upon respondents 1 to 5 to take action against respondents 6 to 15 for encroaching upon the public road by employing the services of Private Security Agencies and for utilizing it for the parking of their vehicles, treating it as their own private parking zone.

2.It has been brought to our notice that the extreme margins of the road are being used by the private shop owners for parking their cars along or that of their customers by putting a rope and earmarking the said space as a private parking zone.  The result is that the public at large is deprived of parking their cars on the margins of the road, unless they are customers of a particular establishment.

3.In the counter affidavit filed by the Chennai Corporation, the  details of the areas where the respondents 6 to 15 park their vehicles, in an unauthorized manner, are mentioned.  From the said counter affidavit it is found that a body called Tamil Nadu Ex-Servicemen Corporation is authorized to collect parking charges on behalf of the Corporation.

4.The private respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 9 have filed counter affidavits, the sum and substance of those counter affidavits are that the Corporation of  Chennai, is collecting parking fees at the rate of Rs.450/- per month per car and the cars are parked in front of their office building.  The 12th respondent has filed a counter stating that they do not have any parking place and the frontage of their shop is completely blocked by hawkers and other squatters and not even an inch of space is available for parking a cycle.


5.The respondents 2, 3, 4 and 5 have filed a common counter affidavit sworn to by the Additional Commissioner of Police (Traffic).  In the counter affidavit it has been stated  that  certain road side margin is 'paid parking area', and the Corporation of Chennai is collecting parking fees and the Traffic Police do not permit any private institution  for parking vehicles on roads other than in the designated parking area.  It is further stated that when a particular area is declared as a paid parking area, the identity of the parked vehicle will not be noted and therefore the Traffic Police cannot take any action for violation of the Motor Vehicles Act.  Further, it is stated that the Police Authorities have not received any complaint from any affected party alleging that they have been threatened by private security agencies.

6.Thus, it is to be noted that in the areas mentioned by the petitioner, certain extent of the road margin has been earmarked as parking area and a fee is levied on the persons who park their vehicles in the paid parking area.    Fee is levied by the Corporation and collected through their agents namely Tamil Nadu Ex-Servicemen Corporation Limited, which is a Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking.

7.As could be seen from the counter affidavit filed by the Commissioner of Corporation of Chennai, in so far as the areas near the establishments of   the  respondents 6 & 9 to 13,  parking being done unauthorisedly though there is certain authorised parking place available; in so far as the respondent No.7 is concerned, it has been stated that the parking is unauthorisedly done by the Bank staff and 8th and 14 respondents are stated to be parking in authorised parking area on fee being collected by the Corporation.  Therefore, the Corporation appears to justify their action by stating that in the 'paid parking area' a consolidated amount is being collected from the respective respondents and the vehicles owned by the said respondents or their employees or customers are being allowed to be parked in the said area.  Photographs have been placed before us to show that these private respondents have either place placards or tide a rope in the paid parking area and have also written that the said area is exclusively reserved for them.

8.We fail to understand as to on what basis the private respondents earmark the paid public parking area as if being their exclusive parking area.  Admittedly what is collected by the Corporation is only a fee.  Even if fee is collected by the Corporation of Chennai that does not entitle the private respondents the right to exclusive use the public paid parking area.  The right of licencee is clearly circumscribed.

9.The power of the Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras to fix parking place for Motor Cabs is traceable to Rule 247 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicle Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') and the Commissioner of Police after consultation with such other authority as they may deem desirable fix such places at which the Motor Cabs may be parked either indefinitely or for  specified period of time and may fix such places where Motor cabs may stop for a longer time than it is necessary for taking up or setting down of passengers.

10.In terms of Rule 379 of the Rules, the Commissioner of Police may approve the parking places within the Chennai City Limits for the purpose of parking motor vehicles other than public service vehicles and goods carriages.  In terms of sub rule 2 of Rule 379 of the Act, the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, shall apply to the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, for approval of proposed parking place for such vehicle and such Application shall be furnished with several particulars as stated in the Rules. Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 379 of the Act deals with the procedure to be adopted while considering such Applications and after approval, the parking place is notified as required under sub-rule 4 of Rule 379 of the Act.    Sub-Rule 5 clearly states that no vehicle shall be parked in the parking place for a period beyond one hour.  The Inspecting Officers of Police Department are authorised by the Commissioner of Police to inspect the parking place for any defects and if such defects are brought to the notice of the Commissioner of Police, he is entitled to revoke such permission granted.  Therefore, from the perusal of these Rules, it is clear that no private person is entitled to exclusive right to park his vehicle in such a notified public parking place as  no such reservation is contemplated under the Rules.  Therefore, it has to be held that the collection of lumpsum licensee fee from the private respondents and exclusively earmarking the notified public parking space for a private persons is illegal.


11.In the light of the above factual and legal position, we dispose of this Writ Petition by directing the respondents 1 to 5 to forthwith take action and ensure that public paid parking area are  available for use as parking area by the general public on payment of such fee as determined  and ensure that the public paid parking area is not exclusively reserved for any private parties and made available to the general public.


11.The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.  No costs.  Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.










rpa

To

1    CORPORATION OF CHENNAI                      
     REP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER
     RIPPON BUILDINGS
     CHENNAI-3.

2    COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     CHENNAI CITY  EGMOREM CHENNAI-8.

3.   DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     TRAFFIC NORTH,  CHENNAI-2.

4.   ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
     TRAFFIC ZONE,  KILPAUK,  CHENNAI-10.

5.   INSPECTOR OF POLICE
     B-1  NORTH BEACH TRAFFIC RANGE
     CHENNAI

a writ of Certiorari to call for all the records of the 2nd respondent contained in


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :-08.09.2010  

Coram

The HONOURABLE MR.M.Y.EQBAL THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
The HONOURABLE  MR. JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM

W.P.No.20165 of 2010 &
M.P.Nos.1&2 of 2010


Aloys Wobben
Argestrasse 19
26607 Aurich
Germany.
Rep. by his power of Attorney holder
Mr.Balan Kombi     ... Petitioner

vs.

1.Enercon (India) Limited
   Plot No.33
   Daman Patiala Road,
   Bhimpore, Daman  396 210

2.Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
   2nd Floor, Annexe-1,
   Guna Complex,
   443, Anna Salai, Chennai  600 018,
   Rep. by its Deputy Registrar .. Respondents


PRAYER :  This writ petition is  filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of Certiorari to call for all the records of the 2nd respondent contained in O.R.A.Nos.3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,19,20, 25,26,27,38,39,40 and 41 of 2009 and quash the impugned order dated 27.07.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent in Miscellaneous Petition Nos.48 to 51, 74 to 81 and 59 to 64 of 2010 in O.R.A.Nos.3,4,5,8,9,7,39,6,41,11, 19,10,20,25,38,26,27 and 40 of 2009 respectively and consequently dismiss O.R.A.Nos.3, 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,19,20,25,26,27,38,39,40 and 41 of 2009.


  For petitioner : Mr.P.S.Raman Senior counsel for
 Mr.Sathish Parasaran

    For Respondents : Mr.V.T.Gopalan Senior counsel and
 Mr.T.V.Ramanujam Senior counsel for
   Mr.Thriyambakkannan and
 Mr.Lakshmikumaran for R1

*****

O R D E R

T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.

The prayer in the writ petition is for issuance of writ of Certiorari to quash the orders passed by the  Intellectual Property Appellate Board, (hereinafter referred to "as the Tribunal") the second respondent herein, in various miscellaneous petitions filed by the petitioner in the Original Revocation Applications pending before the Tribunal.

2.  The matter arises under the Patents Act. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of the writ petition could be briefly set out as hereunder:-
The first respondent herein (hereinafter referred to "as the Company") had filed 18 Original Revocation Applications before the Tribunal for revocation of the patent granted in favour of the writ petitioner under Section 64 of the Patents Act.  In the said original revocation application, the writ petitioner filed the miscellaneous petitions for dismissal of the original petitions.  The case of the writ petitioner was that he is the owner of the various Patents, pursuant to the grant of Patent by the Patent office during 2006 and the first respondent company filed original applications for revocation of the Patents and these applications were pending before the second respondent Tribunal.  In those applications, the writ petitioner has filed individual miscellaneous petitions with the prayer to dismiss the revocation petition filed by the first respondent company and to fix an early date for hearing the miscellaneous petitions challenging the maintainability of the revocation petition.

3. The main ground on which the miscellaneous petitions were filed is by stating that in terms of the Articles of Association of the first respondent company Mr.Yogesh Mehra lacks the competence to file the petition for revocation of the Patents and reliance was placed on Articles 128(1), 157, 158(1), 170(14) and 171(4) of the Articles of Association of the company.  It was further contended that even assuming without admitting Mr.Yogesh Mehra had such a power, the same are not unfettered and that the applicant has initiated proceedings before the Company Law Board (CLB) and the same is pending and the Company Law Board by its order dated 24.09.2007 in petition No.121 of 2007 in C.A.No.484 of 2007 has granted an order of status quo to be maintained with regard to all issues pending in the proceedings and no further action could be taken without leave of the Board, in terms of the subsequent order dated 19.05.2008.  In the above stated background, the writ petitioner sought for dismissal of the revocation petition.

4. The first respondent resisted the application by filing a reply, inter alia contending that the miscellaneous petition for revocation has been affirmed by one Mr.Balan Kombi and no documentary proof has been shown that the said Mr.Balan Kombi is competent to affirm the reply and that as per the Board resolution dated 27.04.2007, Mr.Yogesh Mehra has been duly authorised to defend and institute suits and proceedings on behalf of the company and that in terms of the said resolution, Mr.Yogesh Mehra, being the Managing Director has the requisite locus standi to file and institute the revocation proceedings on behalf of the company.

5.  Apart from the above, in the reply, the respondent company also raised various factual matters in reply to the allegation made by the writ petitioner in the miscellaneous petitions.  The writ petitioner has in turn filed a rejoinder to the reply statement contending that the Board resolution dated 27.04.2007, relied on by the respondent is void and non-est and thus Mr.Yogesh Mehra has no locus standi to file the revocation petition, that the various factual allegations in the reply have been denied.  Similarly, in each of the other miscellaneous petitions separate affidavits, reply and rejoinders have been filed.

6.  The Tribunal took up the miscellaneous petitions for hearing and appears to have heard the matters at length and ultimately after discussing the factual and the legal position observed that there are three ways in which the matter could be disposed of, namely:-
(i)to consider the miscellaneous petition and decide the locus immediately.
(ii)till the Company Law Board decides, adjourn the matter sine die; or
(iii)take up and consider every thing while hearing the original revocation application.
Ultimately, by order dated 27.07.2010, all the miscellaneous petitions were disposed of with a direction to the registry to list the Original Revocation Application on 09.08.2010 to be heard on a day to day basis.  Aggrieved by such order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.


7. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner after extensively setting out the factual aspect of the matter would submit that the writ petitioner has raised the question of locus standi of the first respondent to maintain the application for revocation and such issue ought to have been decided by the Tribunal at the first instance.  That the Tribunal has mixed the concept of locus standi and concept of person interested as defined under the Patents Act and therefore, the order of the Tribunal calls for interference. That the finding of the Tribunal is that the proceedings before the Company Law Board will not affect the proceedings before the Tribunal is erroneous.  Further, it is contended that there is no urgency for the Original Revocation Application to be taken up for consideration, when such applications of the year 2006 are still pending before the Tribunal.   Further, it is contended that the minority share holder has filed the application for revocation and such petition is not maintainable and it tantamounts to the writ petitioner's funds being used to fight a litigation against him. By relying upon the order passed by the Company Law Board dated 29.10.2007, the learned Senior counsel contents that the Company Law Board has ordered of status quo with regard to all issues are pending in the proceedings and therefore, the petitioner is put to irreparable hardship.

8. Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior counsel for the first respondent  would contend that the Tribunal correctly directed the main revocation application itself to be taken up for disposal and that the applications were taken up on 09.08.2010 and have been posted on 14.09.2010 for disposal and no prejudice would be caused to the writ petition. Further, the learned Senior counsel by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. Vs. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto and Others, 1985 2 SCC 152 and Haribhau Madhav Javle Vs. Ramesh Vithal Choudhari and Others, 2002 10 SCC 101 would contend that the question of locus could be decided as one among the several issues and that would be the correct procedure as per the law laid down by the Apex Court.  It is further contended that the Company Law Board by its order dated 19.05.2008 has directed that without leave of the Company Law Board, no Board meeting can be convened or held and no circular resolution is to be proposed be circulated.  This order of the CLB came to be passed on 19.05.2008, and the writ petitioner did not seek the leave of the Company Law Board to hold any Board meeting and at this stage of the matter, the petitioner cannot contend that because of the order passed by the Company Law Board his rights are affected.

9.  We have given our anxious consideration to the contention raised by both the parties and perused the materials available on record.

10.  Admittedly, the preliminary issue raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal does not relate to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but rather the locus standi of one Mr.Yogesh Mehra, to maintain the application for revocation. On the one hand, the said Mr.Yogesh Mehra relied on a Board resolution dated 27.04.2007, which according to them authorised him to institute suits and proceedings on behalf of the company. This is contraverted by the writ petitioner by stating that such resolution dated 27.04.2007 is void and non-est.  Therefore, to decide as to whether the Managing Director of the company has locus standi to maintain the application for revocation before the Tribunal, it is essential that the factual aspects have to be gone into.

11. Therefore, in such circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while laying down the practice and procedure to be adopted where several issues are raised before Court and there is possibility of appeal, the Court must deal with all issues instead of disposing of the case on only one issue.  In fact the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd., referred supra, specifically took note of the fact that when, there is a possibility of appeal all issues have to be taken up and decided.  The facts of the case clearly indicates that there is a definite possibility of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and the present writ petition itself is one such illustration.  Therefore, in our view, the Tribunal rightly directed the miscellaneous petitions to be considered along with the respective Original Revocation Applications and also directed the case to be posted on a specific date and the hearing to be continuous on day to day basis.

12.  Hence, we find no good grounds to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.  The Tribunal is requested to take up the Original Revocation Application along with the miscellaneous petition and hear and dispose of the same preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.  No costs.  Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.                                    











To

Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
2nd Floor, Annexe-1,
Guna Complex,
443, Anna Salai, Chennai  600 018,
Rep. by its Deputy Registrar



pbn

Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records in the order bearing F.No.12016/6/2001-TA (ME)/C


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Dated:05.10.2010

Coram:

The Honourable Mr.M.Y.EQBAL, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
The Honourable Mr.Justice T.S.SIVAGNANAM

Writ Petition No. 1819 of 2010
---------

1. C.Dorali

2. V.Manickam

3. V.Sekar

4. P.Karthan

5. G.Mahendran

6. Siva Paramasivam

7. S.Kanagaraj

8. P.Ramar

9. P.S.Mani

10.K.Kaveri

11.K.L.Shanmugam

vs.

1. Union of India,
    rep. by the Secretary,
    Ministry of Tribal Affairs,
    Shastri Bhavan,
    New Delhi 115.

2. The Registrar General of India,
    2A, Mansingh Road,
    New Delhi  110 011.

3. The Chairperson,
    National Commission for Scheduled Tribes,
    6th Floor, Lok Nayak Bhawan, Khan Market,
    New Delhi  110 003.

4. State of Tamil Nadu,
    rep. by the Secretary,
    Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department,
    Secretariat,
    Chennai  600 009.  Respondents

Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records in the order bearing F.No.12016/6/2001-TA (ME)/C & LM-I (Part.II) dated 8th April, 2009 issued by respondent no.1 and quashing the same and directing respondents 1 to 3 to reconsider the proposal of respondent no.4 mentioned in the said order of respondent no.1 dated 8th April, 2009.

For Petitioners :::  Mr.M.Radhakrishnan

For Respondents
1 to 3 :::  Mr.J.Ravindran,
    Asst.Solicitor General of India,

For Respondent 4 :::  Mr.J.Raja Kalifulla, Govt.Pleader
    Assisted by Mrs.M.Sneha, Govt.Advocate

O R D E R
THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE &
T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J

In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the issue of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus for quashing the order bearing F.No.12016/6/2001-TA (ME)/C & LM-I (Part.II) dated 8th April, 2009 issued by the first respondent namely, the Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Union of India and further directing respondents 1 to 3 to reconsider the proposal of the fourth respondent declaring Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as member of the Scheduled Tribes.

2. It appears that by letter dated 21st August, 2006 addressed to the first respondent, the fourth respondent i.e., Government of Tamil Nadu requested the first respondent to include the aforesaid six names as synonyms of Kurumans in the list of Scheduled Tribes in Tamil Nadu. The petitioners case is that as per the study conducted by the The Study of Director, Tribal Research Centre, Ooty, it reveals that communities like Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar are identical to each other and these names are synonyms to the community of Kurumans and therefore, these communities may be brought under Kurumans in the list of Scheduled Tribes.

3. The first respondent in their counter affidavit has stated that on 15th June, 1999, the Government of India has laid down certain modalities for determining the claims for inclusion in, exclusion from and other modifications in orders specifying Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes lists. The said modalities have been revised on 25th June, 2002. According to this respondent, only those proposals, which have been recommended and justified, by the concerned State Government, the Registrar General of India (RGI) and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) are to be considered for amendment of legislation. The proposal of the fourth respondent has been rejected by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs for inclusion of Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as synonyms of Kurumans in the list of Scheduled Tribes of Tamil Nadu under para (f) of the amended modalities. It is further stated that the aforesaid proposal for inclusion of Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as synonyms of Kurumans ST of Tamil Nadu has again been rejected by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs vide letter dated 8th April, 2009.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

5.  As noticed above, the request of the fourth respondent for declaring the aforementioned 6 names as synonyms of Kurumans has already been rejected twice by the first respondent on the basis of the report of the competent authority.

6. The question, therefore, that falls for consideration is as to whether this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue such a direction again to consider and/or to declare Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as synonyms of Kurumans.

7. A similar matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Nityanand Sharma v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1996 SC 2306. In the aforesaid case the contention of the appellant was that the Lohar community was included in the schedule under the Act, as reflected in the Hindi version of the order, and thereby they are entitled to be recognized as Scheduled Tribes. Answering the said contention, their Lordships held as under: - (paras 7 &8, page 2308)
7. In view of the respective contentions, the question that arises for consideration is: Whether the Court can give declaration of the social status as a Tribe or declare Lohars as Scheduled Tribe in the Act and the Schedule of the Act? Clause (24) of Article 366 defines Scheduled Castes and clause (25) of Article 366 defines Scheduled Tribes. The latter means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this Constitution. (emphasis supplied) Article 341(1) empowers the President, in consultation with the Governor of the State concerned, to specify Scheduled Castes by public notification. Equally, Article 342(1) empowers the President with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case may be. Article 342(2) empowers Parliament, by law, to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued under clause (1), any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification. In other words, it is the constitutional mandate that the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities specified by the President, after consultation with the Governor in the public notification, will be Scheduled Tribes subject to the law made by Parliament alone, which may, by law, include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified by the President. Thereafter, it cannot be varied except by Parliament. The specification is for the purpose of the Constitution.
8. Constitutional rights given in Part III and Part IV of the Constitution are relating to election to Parliament or the State Legislature. Section 2(f) of the Act defines Scheduled Tribes Order. It means the Constitution (Andaman and Nicobar Islands) Scheduled Tribes Order, 1959 made by the President under Article 342 of the Constitution. Section 3 deals with amendment of the Scheduled Castes Order and Section 4 deals with amendment of Scheduled Tribes Order. The Scheduled Tribes Orders are amended in the manner and to the extent specified in the Second Schedule. First Schedule relates to Scheduled Castes and Second Schedule relates to Scheduled Tribes.

8. In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind reported in 2001 (1) SCC 4, the Supreme Court, while deciding a similar issue, observed: - (para.12, page 15)
12. Plain language and clear terms of these articles show (1) the President under clause (1) of the said articles may with respect to any State or Union Territory and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor, by public notification specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within the castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union Territory as the case may be; (2) under clause (2) of the said articles, a notification issued under clause (1) cannot be varied by any subsequent notification except by law made by Parliament. In other words, Parliament alone is competent by law to include in or exclude a caste/tribe from the list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes specified in notifications issued under clause (1) of the said articles. In including castes and tribes in Presidential Orders, the President is authorised to limit the notification to parts or groups within the caste or tribe depending on the educational and social backwardness. It is permissible that only parts or groups within them be specified and further to specify castes or tribes thereof in relation to parts of the State and not to the entire State on being satisfied that it was necessary to do so having regard to social and educational backwardness. The States had opportunity to present their views through Governors when consulted by the President in relation to castes or tribes, parts or groups within them either in relation to the entire State or parts of State. It appears that the object of clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 was to keep away disputes touching whether a caste/tribe is a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe or not for the purpose of the Constitution. Whether a particular caste or a tribe is Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be, within the meaning of the entries contained in the Presidential Orders issued under clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342, is to be determined looking to them as they are. Clause (2) of the said articles does not permit any one to seek modification of the said orders by leading evidence that the caste/Tribe (A) alone is mentioned in the Order but caste/Tribe (B) is also a part of caste/Tribe (A) and as such caste/Tribe (B) should be deemed to be a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe as the case may be. It is only Parliament that is competent to amend the Orders issued under Articles 341 and 342. As can be seen from the entries in the schedules pertaining to each State whenever one caste/tribe has another name it is so mentioned in the brackets after it in the schedules. In this view it serves no purpose to look at gazetteers or glossaries for establishing that a particular caste/tribe is a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe for the purpose of Constitution, even though it is not specifically mentioned as such in the Presidential Orders. Orders once issued under clause (1) of the said articles, cannot be varied by subsequent order or notification even by the President except by law made by Parliament. Hence it is not possible to say that State Governments or any other authority or courts or Tribunals are vested with any power to modify or vary the said Orders. If that be so, no inquiry is permissible and no evidence can be let in for establishing that a particular caste or part or group within tribes or tribe is included in Presidential Order if they are not expressly included in the Orders. Since any exercise or attempt to amend the Presidential Order except as provided in clause (2) of Articles 341 and 342 would be futile, holding any inquiry or letting in any evidence in that regard is neither permissible nor useful.

9. In the instant case, it appears that the proposal of the State Government for inclusion of Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as synonyms of Kurumans in the list of Scheduled Tribes has been considered in detail by the competent authority of the first respondent. It has been categorically held by the competent authority that Kurumans and Kurumbas are not synonyms to each other, but they are two different Scheduled Tribes in the State of Tamil Nadu. Be that as it may. Having regard to the fact that the proposal of the fourth respondent was twice considered and rejected by the competent authority, this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can neither declare Kuruma, Kurumba, Kurumba Gounder, Kurumban and Kurumbar as synonyms of Kurumans nor deem it proper to send the proposal for reconsideration.


10. For the aforesaid reason, no relief can be granted in this writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs.

Index:Yes (M.Y.E., C.J)     (T.S.S., J)
Internet:Yes 05 .10.2010
pv/-
Copy to:
1. Union of India,
    rep. by the Secretary,
    Ministry of Tribal Affairs,
    Shastri Bhavan,
    New Delhi 115.

2. The Registrar General of India,
    2A, Mansingh Road,
    New Delhi  110 011.

3. The Chairperson,
    National Commission for Scheduled Tribes,
    6th Floor, Lok Nayak Bhawan, Khan Market,
    New Delhi  110 003.

4. State of Tamil Nadu,
    rep. by the Secretary,
    Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department,
    Secretariat, Chennai  600 009.










The Honble Chief Justice
   and
    T.S.Sivagnanam, J
------------------------------------
pv/-


















Pre-delivery Order
 in
W.P.No. 1819 of 2010












Delivered on:05 .10.2010






   

Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the order dated 06.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent and quash the same in respect of the petitioner and thus render justice.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:   19..10..2010

CORAM

THE HONBLE Mr.M.Y.EQBAL, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
THE HONBLE Mr.JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM

W.P.No.23141 of 2010
and
M.P.No.1 of 2010
--------------

P.Pugalenthi,
Co-ordination Secretary,
Tamil Nadu Peoples Rights Forum,
No.5, 4th Floor,
Sunkurama Street,
Chennai  600 001. ..Petitioner.

Vs.

1. The Ministry of Home Affairs,
    rep. by Home Secretary,
    New Delhi  110 001.

2. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal,
    Delhi High Court Building,
    Sher Shah Road, New Delhi,
    rep. by its Registrar. ..Respondents.


PRAYER: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the order dated 06.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent and quash the same in respect of the petitioner and thus render justice.
--------------

For Petitioner :: Mr.M.Radhakrishnan
For Respondents :: Mr.M.Ravindran,
   Addl. Solicitor General of India
   assisted by J.Ravindran,
   Assistant Solicitor General  I.
--------------

O R D E R
THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE &
T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J

Heard Mr.M.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner and Mr.M.Ravindran, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondents.

2. In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for the quashing of the order dated 06.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent namely., the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 4(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (in short the Act)

3.  It appears that the first respondent  Union of India issued a notification dated 17th May, 2010 under Section 3(1) and proviso to Section 3(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (Act 37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) declaring the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (in short LTTE) as an unlawful association. The petitioner-Forum said to have filed a petition claiming itself as the sympathizer of LTTE and have a right to appear before the Tribunal. It was contended that the Tribunal is required to adjudicate whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association as an unlawful association. It was contended by Mr.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Forum before the Tribunal that the Tribunal must give an opportunity of hearing before declaring a person or association under the said Act. The Tribunal rejected the petition filed by the petitioner-Forum on the grounds inter alia that the Tribunal had the occasion to consider the submissions made by the other persons including Mr.Vaiko and none of the submissions made by Mr.Radhakrishnan travel beyond the arguments advanced by Mr.Vaiko.

4. Mr.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner before us contended that LTTE is not present in India and only its sympathizers, supporters and agents are present in India. In view of the non-existence of the LTTE in India and in view of the alleged presence of its sympathizers, supporters and agents notices under Section 4(2) of the Act should not only have to be sent to the LTTE in Sri Lanka but also to the alleged sympathizers, supporters and agents who are present in India. According to the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, unless the process prescribed under Section 4(2) of the Act is completed the process of adjudication under Section 4(3) of the Act could not have been commenced by the Tribunal.

5. On the other hand, Mr.M.Ravindran, learned Additional Solicitor General of India has drawn our attention to the relevant provisions of the Act and submitted that the Tribunal while proceeding for adjudication has fully complied with the requirements of the Act.

6. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to declare any association to be unlawful by issue of notification in the official gazette, if the Central Government is of the opinion that such an association has become an unlawful association. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act provides that such notification issued shall specify the grounds on which it is issued and such other particulars as the Central Government may consider necessary. However, the Central Government is not required to disclose any fact which it considers to be against the public interest. Section 4 of the Act provides that if any association is declared unlawful under Section 3, the Central Government shall within 30 days from the date of publication of the notification refer it to the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful. The Tribunal shall thereupon call upon the association affected by notice to show cause and then, after holding an enquiry and adjudicating upon, either confirm or cancel the said notification. For better appreciation Section 4 of the Act is quoted herein below: -
4. Reference to Tribunal. (1) Where any association has been declared unlawful by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3, the Central Government shall, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification under the said sub-
section, refer the notification to the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful.

(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the
Tribunal shall call upon the association affected by notice in writing to show cause, within thirty days from the date of the service of such notice, why the association should not be declared unlawful.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the association or the office-bearers or members thereof, the-Tribunal shall hold an inquiry in the manner specified in section 9 and after calling for such further information as it may consider necessary from the Central Government or from any office-bearer or member of the association, it shall decide whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association to be unlawful and make, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of six months from the date of the issue of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3, such order as it may deem fit either confirming the declaration made in notification or cancelling the same

(4) The order of the Tribunal made under sub-section (3) shall be published in the Official Gazette.

7.  Section 7 of the Act lays down the provision with regard to the power of the Central Government to prohibit the use of funds of the unlawful association. According to this section, after the association has been declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3, the Central Government may issue prohibitory order for the use of funds of unlawful association. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 gives the right to any person aggrieved by such prohibitory order to make an application to the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person voluntarily resides or carries on business to establish that the moneys, securities or credits in respect of which prohibitory order has been made are not being used or are not intended to be used for the purpose of the unlawful association. On receipt of such application, the Court of District Judge shall decide the question. Apart from that on a perusal of sub-section (8) of Section 8 of the Act, it is manifestly clear that any person aggrieved by the notification issued in respect of a place under sub-section (1) or by an order made under sub-section (3) of sub-section (4) may, within 30 days from the date of the notification or order, make an application to the Court of the District Judge for declaring that the place has not been used for the purpose of unlawful association, and the Court of District Judge shall decide the same in accordance with law.
8. In the impugned order, while rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal has observed as under: -
3. Hence, the statement of Mr.M.Ashok Kumar, Superintendent of Police, Q Branch, CID, Chennai, Tamil Nadu was then partly recorded. Since even at the conclusion of this exercise Mr.Chandrasekaran was not available, on the request of Mr.Ruben the proceedings were adjourned to 12.30 p.m. On resumption of proceedings, a petition under Section 4(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had been moved by Mr.M.Radhakrishnan on behalf of Tamil Nadu Peoples Rights Forum which admittedly is not a registered entity. Counsel for Mr.Nedumaran as well as Tamil Nadu Peoples Rights Forum have been heard.
4. As has already been adverted to, this Tribunal had the occasion to consider the submissions made by Mr.Vaiko on his similar request. So far as Tamil Nadu Peoploes Rights Forum is concerned, the address is shown as No.5, 4th Floor, Chennai-600 001; this address is incomplete in material particulars. The application is not supported by an affidavit. The petition has been signed on behalf of the Forum by Mr.P.Pugalenthi. If this Tribunal is to entertain petitions of this nature, the proceedings will be unduly and unjustifiably protracted. Furthermore, none of the submissions made by Mr.Radhakrishnan travel beyond the arguments addressed by Mr.Vaiko. In order to avoid prolixity, the Tribunal thinks it sufficient to refer and rely on the previous orders passed on 25.9.2010.

9. Mr.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Jafar v. Union of India reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 1  and Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. V. C.C.E reported in 1995 (1) SCC 451 and submitted that when a declaration is made by the Central Government by issuing notification, such notification has to be specify the grounds on which declaration is made.   Learned counsel further submitted that it is necessary for the Tribunal to ascertain the credibility of conflicting evidence relating to the points in controversy, and the Tribunal must record its satisfaction after hearing the persons concerned.
10. There is no dispute with regard to the decisions highlighted by the learned counsel. The Tribunal was fully conscious of the legal proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Jamat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India reported in 11995 (1) SCC 428 wherein it is held that in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of a proper adjudication, it is necessary that the Tribunal should have the means to ascertain the credibility of conflicting evidence relating to the points in controversy.
11. In the instant case, as noticed above, the Tribunal has given full opportunity to the persons aggrieved and heard the parties, and therefore, in our view, the petition filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal has rightly been rejected by the Tribunal. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal therefore needs no interference by this Court. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petition is closed.











Sm/pv

Copy to:

1. The Ministry of Home Affairs,
    rep. by Home Secretary,
    New Delhi  110 001.

2. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal,
    Delhi High Court Building,
    Sher Shah Road, New Delhi,
    rep. by its
    Registrar

This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of Mandamus to direct the second respondent to take up the case relating to production supply of fake malarial detection kits by the 7th respondent and to investigate and submit a report before this Hon'ble Court within a stipulated time as fixed by this Hon'ble Court.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :-25.10.2010  

Coram

The HONOURABLE MR.M.Y.EQBAL THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
The HONOURABLE  MR. JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM

W.P.No.19925 of 2010


Dr.C.Anbarasu,
Chairman
Para Medical Wing,
Indian Medical Association,
Tamilnadu State Branch,
304B, Koonur High Road,
Aynavaram, Chennai  600 023. ... Petitioner

vs.

1.Union of India,
   Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
   New Delhi.

2.Joint Director,
   Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI)
   Head of Zone,
   3rd Floor, E.V.K. Sampath Building,
   College Road, Chennai  600 006.

3.State of Tamilnadu
   Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
   Fort St. George,
   Secretariat, Chennai.

4.Deputy Inspector General of Police,
   Crime Branch,
   Criminal Investigation Department (CBCID)
   3rd Block, Sidco Electronic Complex,
   Thiru.Ve.Ka Industrial Estate,
   Guindy, Chennai 600 032.

5.Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation,
  Rep. by its Director,
  Directorate General of Health Services,
  Ministry of Health and family Welfare,
  Government of India,
  FDA Bhawan, ITO, Kotia Road,
  New Delhi 110 002.

6.Assistant Drug Controller,
   Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation,
   No.26, Haddows Road,
   Sastri Bhavan,
   2nd Floor, Annex Building,
   Nungambakkam, Chennai  600 006.            

7.Tamilnadu Bio Medical
   Rep by its Proprietor
   Subiksha Apartments
   Flat No.AF2, 42/6, Kannagi Road,
   Avvai Nagar, Chennai  600 094. ... Respondents

         
PRAYER :  This writ petition is  filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of Mandamus to direct the second respondent to take up the case relating to production supply of fake malarial detection kits by the 7th respondent and to investigate and submit a report before this Hon'ble Court within a stipulated time as fixed by this Hon'ble Court.

       For petitioner      : Mr.T.K.S.Gandhi

       For Respondents: Mr.J.Ravindran
Asst. Solicitor General of India for RR1, 2, 5 & 6
Mr.J.Raja Kalifulla Govt. Pleader for RR3-4
Mr.R.Singaravelan for R7

*****



O R D E R

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE &
T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.

In this writ petition, by way of public interest litigation, the petitioner has sought for a direction upon the second respondent to take up the case relating to production and supply of fake malarial detection kits by the seventh respondent and to investigate the matter.

2. The petitioner claims to be the Chairman of the Para Medical Wing of the Indian Medical Association, Tamil Nadu State Branch and a qualified Allopathic Doctor and owning a hospital at Ayanavaram, Chennai  600023.  It is stated that the petitioner invited quotations from various suppliers for supply of Malaria Detection Kits.  The seventh respondent submitted his quotation dated 28.05.2010 for supply of Fluorex Venous Malaria Detection Test packs and Fluorex Capillary Malaria Detection Test packs, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Kits') which are imported from Denmark.  The petitioner is stated to have placed orders with the seventh respondent for supply of 200 numbers of such kits.  On receiving the product, the petitioner found that the kits did not have import and repacking licence number, lot number and the expiry date and reference number were hand written, which gave room for suspicion as regards the genuinety of the product.  The petitioner has further stated that he had used the kits for testing persons, who were infected with the Malaria as well as those, who are uninfected and the results in both cases were positive.  Therefore, it is contended that  based on wrong test results if a normal person is administered anti malarial treatment, it may lead to dangerous consequences and the doctors are exposed to risk of being sued. Hence, the petitioner submitted representation to the fifth and sixth respondent as well as to the fourth respondent, the DIG of Police (CBCID), calling upon them to initiate action and since there was no response to such petitions/representations, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of this writ petition.

3. When the writ petition came up for admission on 31.08.2010, we took note of a newspaper report in the "Deccan Chronicle" dated 20.08.2010, stating that the CBCID has initiated investigation in the matter.  Therefore, we directed the the learned Government Pleader to seek instructions and inform this Court with regard to the stage of the investigation and the result therein.  Subsequently, the matter was heard on various dates and the respondents 4 to 7 have filed their respective counter affidavits.

4. From the counter affidavit filed by the seventh respondent, it appears that the seventh respondent is a proprietorship concern and Mr.P.R.Magesh is it proprietor, who is engineer by qualification and has  worked with medical diagnostic companies.  That the seventh respondent had valid Import Export Code issued by the Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, dated 17.04.2003, by virtue of which the seventh respondent was entitled to import the Kits. That the firm is registered as a small scale industry and  possess registration under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, Central Sales Tax Act and Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax.  Further, it is stated that the supplier from Denmark M/s.Vitrex Medical, is a World renowned manufacturer of kits and the products, which were repacked in proper manner and taking note of the climatic condition prevailing here the seventh respondent  fixed the expiry date as six months from date of repacking, though the foreign manufacturer has given the expiry date as three years.  Further, in the counter affidavit, it has been stated how these kits have to be used and the equipment used for the purpose of obtaining the required results.  In paragraphs 13 to 15  of the counter affidavit, the seventh respondent has made allegations of malafide against the writ petitioner and stated that on account of certain matrimonial issues between the seventh respondent's cousin brother and his wife, they were certain criminal proceedings pending against his cousin and in view of their acquaintance with the writ petitioner, the present writ petition has been filed with a view to wreak vengeance and it is not a public interest litigation, but motivated on account of malafides.

5. The respondents 1, 5 and 6 through the Assistant Drugs Controller of India in the Central Drug Standard Control Organisation have filed their counter affidavit, inter alia stating that they have not issued any import licence in form No.10 to the seventh respondent for import of these kits and that the label of the imported kits should comply with the Rule 96 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') which lays down detailed procedure relating to the labeling requirements.  Further, it has been stated that a complaint received from the Manager of the writ petitioner's hospital, action was initiated and investigation was conducted on various dates and the out come of the investigation revealed that the seventh respondent did not hold any licence under the Drug and Cosmetics Act, 1940, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for manufacture, stock, sale or import of drugs.  Further, it has been stated that the seventh respondent had imported 50,000 capillary glass tubes from Denmark, which were coated with 0.5% acridine orange  solution purchased from a company at Bangalore, dried at room temperature and packed in a plastic tubes with silicon cap and then packed in a card-board boxes.  The boxes were affixed with locally printed label, showing details as "Fluorex Venous Blood Test Pack, manufactured by Fluorex Medical Denmark", imported and repacked by the seventh respondent, the stock of the kits were not available with the seventh respondent at the time of investigation nor available in the whole sale market.  The report of the preliminary investigation was forwarded to the fifth respondent and the fifth respondent by communication dated 07.09.2010 directed the sixth respondent to reinvestigate the matter for further necessary action.  Accordingly, reinvestigation was undertaken and a joint inspection was conducted by Senior Drug Inspectors from the office of the Director of Drugs Control, Tamilnadu and Drug Inspectors from the Central Drug Standard Control Organisation and the inspection was completed on 01.10.2010.  The out come of the reinvestigation was submitted in the form of report before this Court.

6. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, the learned Assistant Solicitor General produced copy of the communication dated 16.10.2010 from the fifth respondent to the sixth respondent, wherein the fifth respondent has directed to initiate the legal action against the seventh respondent under the provisions of the Act and Rules.  We  granted an opportunity to the seventh respondent to submit their objections if any to the report submitted by the respondents 5 and 6.  Pursuant to which, the seventh respondent filed an additional counter affidavit contending that licence is not required under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules, since as per the Import Export Policy -ITC (HS) Classification of Export and Import, the kits imported by the seventh respondent are not prohibited or restricted items and as per the policy guidelines, they are freely importable.  It is further contended that as per the original pack imported from Denmark, the expiry date is three years, but the seventh respondent has given only six months as the date of expiry, from the date of repacking and this has been done in public interest.  Further, it is contended that the seventh respondent has closed down the business in June 2009 and they have not made any imports thereafter.  It is further stated that if the seventh respondent decides to continue the business, he undertakes to obtain licence.

7. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit denying the allegations of malafide attributed by the seventh respondent in his counter affidavit.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials on record including the sample kits, which were produced by the petitioner as well as by the seventh respondent.

9.  The complaint of the petitioner is that the seventh respondent did not possess a valid licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act for the purpose of repacking and sale of the Malaria Detection Kits, which are said to have been imported by the seventh respondent from Denmark; that the products which was sold by the seventh respondent were made locally by purchasing material from the local market and the seventh respondent  himself had hand written the date of expiry on the packing, which was locally made.  Therefore, it is contended that the public at large have been put at a peril on account of these kits sold by the seventh respondent, which are fake kits and therefore the matter requires to be investigated.

10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the seventh respondent would contend that the provisions of the Act and Rules are not applicable to the product repacked and sold by the seventh respondent and that no licence is required for the import of these products, in terms of the Import Export Policy, as they are freely importable under the policy guidelines.

11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1,2,5 & 6 relied upon the reinvestigation report, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-
1.The firm has imported 67,000 (500X20 packs) QBC venous blood tubes in total for malarial parasite detection from M/s.Vitrex Medical A/s. (formerly Fluorex Medicals A/s, a subsidiary of Modulohm A/S) Denmark between 2005-2009.  And one consignment of 37,000 venous blood tubes were rejected and destroyed by him.
2.The firm used to repack 200 QBC venous blood tubes (10X20 vials) per carton box with equival no. of closure caps and polystyrene floats.  Each vial and box were labelled and the labels were printed locally and contains following details:-
 i)  Flourex, IVD, Venous Blood Test Pack,
 ii) Reagents per tube (maximum): Acridine Orange (15.5ug),
     Potassium Oxalate (0.9mg), and stabilizers.
 iii) Lot No. and Expiry date
iv)Manufactured by: Fluorex Medical A/S Herlev, Copenhagen,       Denmark.
v)Imported & repacked by:Tamilnad Bio Medicals, Chennai, India.
3. The firm has used Lot no. of venous blood tubes of M/s.Vitrex Medicals A/S, Denmark on the label of repacked box of FluorexTM, IVD, Venous Blood Text Pack.  The Expiry date was decided by him from the date of packing and date of manufacture was not mentioned on the repacked box of Fluorex TM, IVD, Venous Blood Test Pack.
4. The firm was importing QBC Blood venous tubes coated with Acridine orange (0.5%), Potassium oxalate, EDTA & stabilizers (coating density  0.02mm) from M/s.Vitrex Medical A/S but after repacking label shows only coatings of Acridine Orange (15.5ug) Potassium Oxalate (0.9mg), and stabilizers.
5. The firm does not hold manufacturing or sale license under Drugs & Cosmetics Act 1940.
6.Since no stocks of QBC venous blood tubes for MP/MF detection imported from M/s. Vitrex Medical A/S, Denmark and Fluorex TM - Venous blood text pack, repacked by Tamilnad Bio Medicals, Tamilnadu were available in the said premises, sample could not be drawn for analysis.
7.As per his statement he has submitted most of the records of purchase and sales before the Court of Law.
8.The firm has not obtained any import licence under Drugs & Cosmetics Act 1940 from the DCG (I) New Delhi.

12. To decide the controversy, it would be necessary to look into certain provisions of the Act and Rules.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chimanlal Jagivandas Sheth vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 665, considered the object of the Act and held that the main object of the Act is to prevent sub-standards in drugs, presumably for maintaining high standards of medical treatment. That would certainly be defeated if the necessary concomitants of medical or surgical treatment were allowed to be diluted; the very same evil which the Act intends to eradicate would continue to subsist.

14. The Act was intended to regulate the import, manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs and cosmetics. Section 3(b) defines 'drug' and for the purpose of this case clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 3(b) would be relevant, which are reproduced hereunder:-
(i) all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of any disease or disorder in human beings or animals, including preparations applied on human body for the purpose of repelling insects like mosquitoes;
(iv) such devices intended for internal or external use in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or animals, as may be specified from time to time by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, after consultation with the Board.  

15. Section 3(f) defines 'manufacture' in relation to any drug or cosmetic to include any process or part of a process for making, altering, packing, labeling, etc., or otherwise treating or adopting any drug or cosmetic with a view to its sale or distribution of any drug or packing of any drug or cosmetic in the ordinary course of retail business.

16. In terms of Section 17 a drug shall be deemed to be misbranded, if its label or container bears any statement, which makes any false claim for the drug, which is false or misleading in any particular. As per Section 17A (f), a drug shall be deemed to be adulterated, if any substance has been mixed therewith so as to reduce its quality or strength.  In terms of Clause (e) of Section 17B a drug shall be deemed to be a spurious, if it purports to be a product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a product. In terms of Section 18, there is prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs and cosmetics except in accordance with the conditions of the licence issued for such purpose.

17. Rule 21(a) of the Rules defines 'Import licence' to mean either a licence in Form 10 to import drugs excluding those specified in Schedule X, or a licence in Form 10-A to import drugs specified in Schedule X and in terms of Rule 23, import licence is required in Form 10 for import of drugs excluding those specified in Schedule X.  The application for grant of import licence should be in the Form and manner prescribed in Rule 24 and the licensing authority on being satisfied that, if granted, the condition of the licence would be observed, issue a import licence in Form 10 by exercising power under Rule 27.  Further, the rules provide for elaborate procedure for cancellation or suspension of such licenses granted.

18. Thus on a conjoint reading of the provision of the Act and the Rules, it could hardly be stated that the product, which was imported by the seventh respondent is not a "drug", as could be seen from the definition of the term "drug" Section 3(b), even a device intended for internal and external use in the diagnosis or treatment is a "drug".  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chimanlal Jagivandas Sheth, referred supra considered the scope of the definition of the Section 3(b) held as hereunder:-
3. Though an attempt was made to argue that the said articles were had been proved to be below the prescribed standard, it was subsequently given up. The only question that was argued is whether the said articles are drugs within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. The said section reads:
 drug includes:
(i) all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine, and
(ii) such substances (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the human body or intended to be used for the destruction of vermins or insects which cause disease in human beings on animals as may be specified from time to time by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
The said definition of drugs is comprehensive enough to take in not only medicines but also substances intended to be used for or in the treatment of diseases of human beings or animals. This artificial definition introduces a distinction between medicines and substances which are not medicines strictly so-called. The expression substances, therefore, must be something other than medicines but which are used for treatment. The part of the definition which is material for the present case is substances intended to be used for or in the treatment. The appropriate meaning of the expression substances in the section is things. It cannot be disputed, and indeed it is not disputed, that absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze are substances within the meaning of the said expression. If so, the next question is whether they are used for or in treatment. The said articles are sterilized or otherwise treated to make them disinfectant and then used for surgical dressing; they are essential materials for treatment in surgical cases. Besides being aseptic these articles have to possess those qualities which are utilized in the treatment of diseases. Thus for instance, in the case of guaze-one of the articles concerned in this appeal  it has to conform to a standard of absorbency in order that it might serve its purpose: otherwise the fluid which oozes is left to accumulate at the site of the wound or sore. The legislature designedly extended the definition of drug so as to take in substances which are necessary aids for treating surgical or other cases. The main object of the Act is to prevent sub-standards in drugs, presumably for maintaining high standards of medical treatment. That would certainly be defeated if the necessary concomitants of medical or surgical treatment were allowed to be diluted: the very same evil which the Act intends to eradicate would continue to subsist. Learned Counsel submitted that surgical instrument would not fall within the definition and that guaze and lint would fall within the same class. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to definie exhaustively the substances falling within the definition of drugs; and we consider that whether or not surgical instruments are drugs, the articles concerned in this case are. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon a report of a high powered committee consisting of expert doctors, who expressed the opinion in the report that as the surgical dressings did not come under the purview of the Drugs Act, no control on their quality was being exercised. Obviously, the opinion of the medical experts would not help us in the construing a statutory provision. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the said articles are substances used for or in the treatment within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act.

19. It is seen from the broachers filed in the typed set of papers that it is the coated capillary tubes in the Malaria Detection Kits are used to draw blood samples from the patients and comes into contact directly with the patient's body (finger) and therefore, it cannot be stated that it is not a "drug".

20.  In view of what has been stated above, we are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the seventh respondent that the Malaria Detection Kits are not "drugs" as defined under Section 3(b) of the Act.  Therefore, we hold Malaria Detection Kits are "drugs" within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act.  It is stated that the seventh respondent imported the kits from Denmark through known channels and in terms of the Import-Export Policy guidelines, no import license is required for the import of such kits as they have been classified as diagnosis instruments and apparatus. The scope of the Import Export Policy guidelines operate in a different field in contra distinction to the field occupied by the Drug and Cosmetics Act and Rules framed thereunder.  The policy guidelines only stipulates that the diagnostic instruments are freely importable, and such is referable to the licence required under the provisions of the Foreign Trade Development and Regulation Act and to the Customs Tariff Act. However, on import, such goods are subject to examination and the customs authorities would render a finding as regards the classification and as to whether the import manifest presented by the importer has correctly classified the product, which was imported, and whether it did not require on import licence.

21.  We have seen that for import of drugs a licence is required under provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules in Form No.10 and admittedly, the seventh respondent did not possess any such licence and this prima facie appears to be a violation of provisions of the Act and the Rules.

22. The next contention raised by the seventh respondent that process of repacking and labeling does not amount to manufacture under the Act, is without any basis. We have seen the definition of term "manufacture" as defined Section 3(f), which includes any process or part of process of packing of a "drug" with a view to sale, would fall within the ambit of the term "manufacture". Thus the exercise undertaken by the seventh respondent, namely that of repacking and labeling would squarely fall within the definition of 3(f) of the Act and amount to manufacture.

23. Though elaborate submissions were made by the learned counsel for the seventh respondent stating that the writ petition itself is motivated on account of mala fide intention, we are not inclined to go into the said aspect in view of the factual finding recorded by us in the preceding paragraphs to the effect that the seventh respondent carried on an activity without obtaining the requisite licence.   It is the case of the seventh respondent that on and after June 2009, he has not been making any imports. The allegation against the seventh respondent that what has been repacked and sold are not, the products which had been imported from Denmark.  If the out come of the investigation reveals that the seventh respondent has passed off indigenous kits representing as if they are fully imported from Denmark, the issue is very serious.  However, no material has been placed before us to show that any cases have been reported on account of any treatment being administered due to wrong diagnosis by using the kits marketed by the seventh respondent.

24. Be that as it may, we feel that the matter requires deeper probe by the competent authorities namely, fifth and sixth respondents.  It is seen that pursuant to the reinvestigation conducted on 01.10.2010, a report has been submitted which had been extracted above.  Based on such report, the fifth respondent by proceedings dated 16.10.2010, has directed legal action to be initiated against the seventh respondent for contravening the provisions of the Act and Rules.

25. As could be seen from the reinvestigation report, Mr.P.R.Magesh proprietor of the seventh respondent has fully cooperated with the investigation and also gave statement  before the officers.  While, we are at it, we deem it appropriate to direct the fifth and sixth respondent to also conduct wider investigation in to such import of kits, and as to whether there is any violation committed, while such kits are marketed locally.  It is needless to state that such investigation shall be done strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules and in full compliance of the principles of natural justice.

26. In the result, the writ petition is disposed of with direction to fifth and sixth respondents to proceed in the matter against the seventh respondent in accordance with law, after affording effective opportunity to the seventh respondent to put forth their contentions and necessary action may be taken as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

27. We feel that the public at large should be sensitized on issues as brought to light in this public interest litigation, by issuing public notices in newspapers and distribution of pamphlets and educating the public as to in what manner, they should get themselves tested for such diseases and not to fall a prey to spurious drugs or use of improper diagnostic materials or equipments leading to improper diagnosis.  No costs.    










pbn        

To

1.Union of India,
   Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
   New Delhi.

2.Joint Director,
   Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI)
   Head of Zone,
   3rd Floor, E.V.K. Sampath Building,
   College Road, Chennai  600 006.

3.State of Tamilnadu
   Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
   Fort St. George,
   Secretariat, Chennai.

4.Deputy Inspector General of Police,
   Crime Branch,
   Criminal Investigation Department (CBCID)
   3rd Block, Sidco Electronic Complex,
   Thiru.Ve.Ka Industrial Estate,
   Guindy, Chennai 600 032.

5.Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation,
  Rep. by its Director,
  Directorate General of Health Services,
  Ministry of Health and family Welfare,
  Government of India,
  FDA Bhawan, ITO, Kotia Road,
  New Delhi 110 002.

6.Assistant Drug Controller,
   Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation,
   No.26, Haddows Road,
   Sastri Bhavan,
   2nd Floor, Annex Building,
   Nungambakkam, Chennai  600 006.            

7.Tamilnadu Bio Medical
   Rep by its Proprietor
   Subiksha Apartments
   Flat No.AF2, 42/6, Kannagi Road,
   Avvai Nagar,
   Chennai 600 094

LTTE In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 28.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 10..11..2010

CORAM

THE HONBLE Mr.M.Y.EQBAL, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
THE HONBLE Mr.JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM

W.P.No.25041 of 2010
and
M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2010
------------
Vijayaratnam Sivanesan,
Residing at Route des Cliniques 39,
1700 Fribourg, Swiss
(Holder of Swiss Travel Document:N0029602)
Represented by his Power of Attorney Holder
Kalaiarasu,
S/o.K.A.Ramasamy,
Ramaiyan Thottam,
Vadugapalayam,
Gobichettipalayam,
Tamil Nadu  638 476. ..Petitioner.
Vs.

1. The Ministry of Home Affairs,
    Government of India,
    Rep. by Home Secretary,
    New Delhi  110 001.

2. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal,
     Delhi High Court Building,
     Sher Shah Road, New Delhi.
     Rep. by its Registrar. ..Respondents.

PRAYER: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records in order dated 28.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent and to quash the same.
-------------

For Petitioner :: Mr.M.Radhakrishnan
For Respondents :: Mr.M.Ravindran,
   Addl. Solicitor General
   Assisted by Mr.J.Ravindran,
   Asst. Solicitor General
--------------

O R D E R

The Honble The Chief Justice

In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 28.10.2010 passed by the 2nd respondent  Tribunal rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner under the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
2. The petitioners case, inter alia, as set out in the writ petition is that the petitioner Vijayaratnam Sivanesan joined the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (in short LTTE) in November 1983 and worked as Video Cameraman. He was arrested by the Tamil Nadu police in Madras in 1988 along with one Mr.Sathasivam Krishnakumar @ Kiddu and 80 others. After the said arrest, the petitioner was transferred to the Indian Army camp at Point Pedro in Sri Lanka. The petitioner was kept there for three months, and thereafter, he was transferred to another Indian Army Camp at Kankesanthurai. It is stated by the petitioner that after he was transferred to Indian Army Camp he was released by the Indian Army on 5th March, 1990, and since, he was released he left the LTTE in 9th March, 1990. In the year 2010, the first respondent  Union of India issued a notification dated 17th May, 2010 under Section 3(1) and proviso to Section 3(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) declaring LTTE as an unlawful association. The petitioner through his alleged Power of Attorney Holder Kalaiarasu, S/o.K.A.Ramasamy filed a petition under Section 4(3) of the Act before the Tribunal for cancellation of declaration made in the notification dated 17th May, 2010. The petitioner also filed petitions under Section 5 of the Act for the supply of copies of all the documents produced before the Tribunal during the hearing and also summoning the witnesses. The Tribunal rejected both the petitions by its impugned order dated 28.10.2010. Hence, the present writ petition.
3. Mr.M.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner assailed the impugned order mainly on the ground that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not considering the application and for not giving full hearing on the ground of paucity of time. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal further committed grave error of law in questioning the genuineness of the Power of Attorney on the basis of which the petitions were filed before the Tribunal. He submitted that the Tribunal further misdirected itself in saying that the affidavit was not properly filed.
4. Mr.M.Ravindran, learned Additional Solicitor General of India submitted that in the facts of the case the Tribunal rightly rejected the petitions. According to him, admittedly, after the petitioner was released by the Indian Army on 5th March, 1990, he left the LTTE movement on 9th March, 1990. Since, the petitioner is not involved in the activities of the LTEE movement after 9th March, 1990 the question of entertaining his petition does not arise.
5. It has not been disputed that the petitioner after his release by the Indian Army left the LTTE movement on 9th March, 1990. This fact has been admitted from the certificate issued by the so called International Secretariat of the LTTE stating that the petitioner was released by the Indian Army on 5th March, 1990, and soon after his release he left the movement on 9th March, 1990. In the Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed in favour of Mr.Kalaiarasu it was reiterated that the petitioner left the movement as far back as in 1990.
6. On a perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that the Tribunal is of the view that there was no sufficient cause for hearing the petition filed before the Tribunal through the Power of Attorney holder namely, Mr.Kalaiarasu, who has sworn affidavit on behalf of the petitioner Mr.Sivanesan. According to the Tribunal, there was no difficulty for swearing an affidavit by the petitioner himself when the Power of Attorney was executed by him on 22.10.2010. We fully agree with the view taken by the Tribunal while rejecting the petition.
7. The word association has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, which means any combination or body of individuals. Section 2(f) of the Act defines the word unlawful activity as under: -
unlawful activity in relation to an individual or association, means many action taken by such individual or association(whether by committing an act or by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise,
(i) which is intended, or supports any claim to bring about, on any ground whatsoever, the cession of a part of the territory of India or the secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union, or which incites any individual or group of individuals to bring about such cession or secession;
(ii) which disclaims, questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India.
Similarly, Section 2(g) of the Act defines unlawful association, as under: -
unlawful association means any association-
(i) which has for its object any unlawful activity, or which encourages or aids persons to undertake any unlawful activity, or of which the members undertake such activity; or
(ii) which has for its object any activity which is punishable under Section 153A or Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or which encourages or aids persons to undertake any such activity, or of which the members undertake any such activity
8. Section 4 of the Act inter alia provides that if any association is declared unlawful by a notification issued by the Central Government, the notification shall be referred to the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 confers power upon the Tribunal to call upon the association effected by notice in writing to show cause within 30 days from the date of service of notice as to why the association should not be declared unlawful.
9. In the petition filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal through his so called Power of Attorney holder, no where it is mentioned that the Attorney is also a member of the association or in any way interested in the activities of the association.
10. It cannot be disputed that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was enacted for the purpose of providing more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations.  The sole object of the Act is to provide national integrity and to prevent any activity which is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Having regard to the aim and object of the aforesaid legislation, we are of the considered opinion that if any association or individual moves before the Tribunal for declaration that such association is not unlawful, the member of such association shall have to file a personal affidavit and he cannot resist the notification through the Power of Attorney holder.
11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, and also having regard to the fact that the petition filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal through its Power of Attorney holder has rightly been rejected by the Tribunal, we do not find any strong reasons to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions are closed.

(M.Y.E., C.J.) (T.S.S., J.)
   10..11..2010.
Index : Yes / No
Internet: Yes / No
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The Honble The Chief Justice
and
T.S.Sivagnanam, J.
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Pre  Delivery Order
in
                  W.P.No.25041 of 2010.












Delivered on:  10..11..2010.